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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which imposes a serious
threat to DNN-based decision systems. In this paper, we propose
to apply the lossy Saak transform to adversarially perturbed
images as a preprocessing tool to defend against adversarial
attacks. Saak transform is a recently-proposed state-of-the-art for
computing the spatial-spectral representations of input images.
Empirically, we observe that outputs of the Saak transform
are very discriminative in differentiating adversarial examples
from clean ones. Therefore, we propose a Saak transform based
preprocessing method with three steps: 1) transforming an
input image to a joint spatial-spectral representation via the
forward Saak transform, 2) apply filtering to its high-frequency
components, and, 3) reconstructing the image via the inverse Saak
transform. The processed image is found to be robust against
adversarial perturbations. We conduct extensive experiments to
investigate various settings of the Saak transform and filtering
functions. Without harming the decision performance on clean
images, our method outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial
defense methods by a substantial margin on both the CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet datasets. Importantly, our results suggest
that adversarial perturbations can be effectively and efficiently
defended using state-of-the-art frequency analysis.
Index Terms—adversarial examples, adversarial defense, saak
transform
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in deep learning have made unprecedented
success in many real-world computer vision problems such as
face recognition, autonomous driving, person re-identification,
etc. [1]–[3]. However, it was first pointed by Szegedy et al.
[4] that deep neural networks (DNN) can be easily fooled
by adding carefully-crafted adversarial perturbations to input
images. These adversarial examples can trick deep learning
systems into erroneous predictions with high confidence. It
was further shown in [5] that these examples exist in the
physical world. Even worse, adversarial attacks are often
transferable [6], [7]; namely, one can generate adversarial
attacks without knowing the parameters of a target model.
These observations have triggered broad interests in adver-
sarial defense research to improve the robustness of DNN-
based decision systems. Currently, defenses against adversarial
attacks can be categorized into two major types. One is to mask
the gradients of the target neural networks by modifying them
through adding layers or changing loss/activation functions,
e.g., [8]–[10]. The other is to remove adversarial perturbations
by applying transformations to input data [11]–[14]. Since
these transformations are non-differentiable, it is difficult for
adversaries to attack through gradient-based methods.
In this work, we focus on adverserial attacks to the convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) and propose a defense method
that maps input images into a joint spatial-spectral represen-
tation with the forward Saak Transform [15], purifies their
spatial-spectral representations by filtering out high-frequency
components and, then, reconstructs the images. As illustrated
in Fig. 1, the proposed mechanism is applied to images as
a preprocessing tool before they goes through the CNN. We
explore three filtering strategies and apply them to transformed
representations to effectively remove adversarial perturbations.
The rationale is that, as adversarial perturbations are usually
undetectable by the human vision system (HVS), reducing
high-frequency components should contribute to adversarial
noise removal without hurting the decision accuracy of clean
data much since it preserves components that are important
to the HVS in restored images. We propose to use the Saak
Transform [15] to perform the frequency analysis. As the
state-of-the-art for computing spatial-spectral representation,
our empirical results demonstrate that Saak coefficients of
high spectral dimensions are discriminative for adversarial and
clean examples. Our algorithm is efficient since it demands
neither adversarial training with any label information nor
modification of neural networks.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks have been extensively studied since the
very earliest attempt [4], which generated L-BFGS adversarial
examples by solving a box-constrained optimization problem
to fool the neural networks. Goodfellow et al. [16] developed
an efficient fast gradient sign method (FGSM) to add adver-
sarial perturbations by computing the gradients of the cost
function w.r.t the input. Along this direction, Kurakin et al.
[5] proposed a basic iterative method (BIM) that iteratively
computes the gradients and takes a small step in the direction
(instead of a large one like the FGSM). Later, Dong et al. [17]
integrated a momentum term to the BIM to stabilize update
directions. Papernot et al. [18] generated an adversarial attack
by restricting the L0-norm of perturbations. DeepFool (DF)
[19] iteratively calculates perturbations to take adversarial
images to the decision boundary which is linearized in the
high-dimensional space. It was further extended to fool a
network with a single universal perturbation [20]. Carlini
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Fig. 1. Demonstration of our proposed method to filter out the adversarial perturbations with the multi-stage Saak transform.
and Wagner [21] proposed three variants of CW adversarial
attacks under L0, L2 and Linf distance constraints. Chen
et al. [22] generated a strong L1 attack by adding elastic-
net regularization to combine L1 and L2 penalty functions.
Unlike above-mentioned methods, Xiao et al. [23] proposed
a novel method that crafts adversarial examples by applying
spatial and locally-smooth transformation instead of focusing
on pixel-level change. Su et al. [24] presented a way to attack
neural networks by changing only one pixel from each image
through a differential evolution algorithm.
Recently, a few defense techniques have been proposed in
detecting and defending against adversarial attacks. Papernot
et al. [8] proposed a defensive distillation method that uses
soft labels from a teacher network to train a student model. Gu
and Rigazio [25] applied stacked denoising auto-encoders to
reduce adversarial perturbations. Li and Li [26] used cascaded
SVM classifiers to classify adversarial examples. They also
showed that 3×3 average filters can mitigate adversarial effect.
Recently, Tramer et al. [27] achieved good results by training
networks with adversarial images generated from different
models. Guo et al. [11] applies input transformations such
as cropping, bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression and total
variance minimization to remove adversarial perturbations.
Similarly, Xu et al. [12] proposed several strategies, including
median smoothing and bit-depth reduction, to destruct adver-
sarial perturbations spatially. Dziugaite et al. [28] investigated
the effect of JPEG compression on adversarial images. Based
on that, Akhtar et al. [29] built a perturbation detector using
the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). Very recently, Liu et al.
[13] designed an adversarial-example-oriented table to replace
the default quantization table in JPEG compression to remove
adversarial noise.
The Saak transform [15] provides an efficient, scalable
and robust tool for image representation. It is a represen-
tation not derived by differentiation. This makes gradient-
based or optimization-based attack difficult to apply. The Saak
transform has several advantages over the DCT in removing
adversarial perturbations. First, Saak transform kernels are
derived from the input data while the ones used in DCT are
data independent. Saak kernels trained with clean data from
a specific dataset are more effective in removing perturbation
noise. Furthermore, the PCA is used in the Saak transform
to remove statistical dependency among pixels, which is
optimal in theory. The DCT is known to be a low-complexity
approximation to the PCA in achieving the desired whitening
effect. Finally, the multi-stage Saak transform can preserve the
prominent spatial-spectral information of the input data, which
contributes to robust classification of attacked images. In this
work, we investigate Saak coefficients of each spectral com-
ponent, and observe that high frequency channels contribute
more to adversarial perturbations. We conduct experiments on
the CIFAR-10 and the ImageNet datasets and show that our
approach outperforms all state-of-the-art approaches.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
A. Problem Formulation
Before introducing the proposed method, we formulate the
problem of adversarial attacks and defenses with respect to
a given neural network. A neural network is denoted by a
mapping y = f(x), where x ∈ RW×H×D is and input image
of size W ×H ×D and y ∈ N is the predicted output vector.
Given neural network model f , clean image x and its ground-
truth label yˆ, crafting an adversarial example denoted by x′
can be described as a box-constraint optimization problem:
min
x′
∥∥x′ − x∥∥
p
, s.t. y = yˆ, f(x′) 6= yˆ, (1)
where ‖·‖ is the Lp norm. Our goal is to find a transformation
function Ψ(·) to mitigate the adversarial effect of x′. In
other words, we aim at obtaining a transformation such that
predictions of the transformed adversarial examples are as
close to ground-truth labels as possible. Ideally, f(Ψ(x′)) =
f(Ψ(x)) = f(x) = yˆ. In most settings of recent attacks, an
adversary can have direct access to the model f(x)and attack
the model by taking advantage of the gradients of the network
w.r.t the input. For this reason, a desired transformation, Ψ(·),
should be non-differentiable. This will make attacks on the
target model f(Ψ(·)) more challenging even if an attacker
can access all parameters in f(·) and Ψ(·).
Fig. 2. From left to right: The distributions (histograms) of Saak coefficients of clean images and FGSM adversarial examples in four representative low
and high spectral components are shown in (a) and (b), respectively. In (a), distributions of Saak coefficients belonging to low spectral dimension 0 to 3 are
shown. In (b), distributions of Saak coefficients belonging to high spectral dimension 45 to 48 are shown. The y-axis represents the values of Saak coefficients.
As shown in (b), for high spectral components, the Saak coefficients distributions are different between clean and adversarial examples. In (c) and (d), the
normalized and the original RMSE (root-mean-squared-error) values between clean and FGSM adversarial examples in different spectral components are
shown. The y-axis in both figures represents the spectral dimension of Saak coefficients. In (c), we can observe that clean and adversarial examples have
different coefficient values in high spectral dimensions. (These results are obtained from two-stage Saak transform with 2× 2 local cuboids.)
B. Image Transformation via Saak Coefficients Filtering
Saak Transformation of an image. As shown in the left
part of Fig. 1, an image is decomposed into blocks of 2 × 2
pixels (or local cuboids (LCs) of shape 2× 2× k, where k is
the spectral dimension). Then, the KLT transform is conducted
on the block (or cuboid) by merging four spatial nodes into
one parent node. This process is recursively conducted stage
by stage in the forward multi-stage Saak transform. Note that,
2× 2 is a typical size of LCs for illustration purpose, we can
use arbitrary size in practice. The signed KLT coefficients in
each stage are called Saak coefficients. The Saak coefficients
are discriminative features of the input image. One can define
a multi-stage inverse Saak transform that converts cuboids
of lower spatial resolutions and high spectral resolutions
to cuboids of higher spatial resolutions and lower spectral
resolutions and, eventually, reconstructs the approximate (or
original) image depending on whether the lossy (or lossy) Saak
transform is adopted.
Saak coefficients as discriminative features. We compare
the histogram of Saak coefficient values of clean (in blue)
and adversarial images (in green) in four representative low
and high spectral components in Figs. 2 (a) and (b), respec-
tively. Following the experiment setup in [13], the adversarial
examples are generated using FGSM algorithms on the first
100 correctly classified samples in the CIFAR-10 test set.
We remark that similar observations can be found in other
adversarial attacks. We see that clean and adversarial im-
ages share similar distributions in lower spectral components.
However, for high spectral components, adversarial examples
have much larger variances than clean examples. These results
indicate that high-frequency Saak coefficients have discrimina-
tive power in distinguishing adversarial and clean examples.
In addition, we show the normalized and the original root-
mean-square error of Saak coefficients between clean images
and adversarial examples in Figs. 2 (c) and (d), respectively.
After normalization by the range of clean Saak coefficients,
we see clearly that the difference between clean and adversar-
ially perturbed images primarily lies in high-frequency Saak
coefficients. Based on the above observation, we propose to
use the multi-stage Saak transform [15] as the transformation
function Ψ(·). As mentioned earlier, the Saak transform can
offer a joint spatial-spectral representation. It maps a local
3D cuboid into a 1D rectified spectral vector via a one-stage
Saak transform. Multiple local 3D cuboids can be transformed
in parallel, and the union of them form a global 3D cuboid.
The global cuboid consists of two spatial dimensions and one
spectral dimension. The one-stage Saak transform consists of
two cascaded operations: 1) signal transform via PCA and 2)
sign-to-position format conversion. It allows both lossless and
lossy transforms. The distance between any two input vectors
and that of their corresponding output vectors is preserved at
a certain degree. Furthermore, the one-stage Saak transform
can be extended to multi-stage Saak transforms by cascading
multiple one-stage Saak transforms so as to provide a wide
range of spatial-spectral representations and higher order of
statistics.
C. Mathematical Formalization
Mathematically, the Saak-based preprocessing technique
can be written as
Ψ(x′) = S−1(ω(S(x′))), (2)
where x′ is an adversarial example, S(·) and S−1(·) are the
forward and inverse multi-stage Saak transforms, respectively,
and ω(·) denote a filtering function to be discussed later. Given
Saak coefficients θ = S(x′) in an intermediate stage, one
can reconstruct an image using the inverse Saak transform on
filtered Saak coefficients denoted by ω(S(x′)). In other words,
we convert an adversarial perturbation removal problem into
a Saak coefficients filtering problem. We attempt to formalize
the idea in Sec. III-B below.
First, we have∥∥Ψ(x′)−Ψ(x)∥∥
2
=
∥∥S−1(ω(θ′))− S−1(ω(θ))∥∥
2
≈ ∥∥ω(θ′)− ω(θ)∥∥
2
=
∥∥ω(θ′l)− ω(θl)∥∥2 + ∥∥ω(θ′h)− ω(θh)∥∥2 ,
(3)
where θh and θl denote the orthogonal subsets of high- and
low-frequency Saak coefficients. The approximation is based
on the semi-distance preserving property of the inverse Saak
transform. Under the assumption that adversarial noise lies in
high-frequency regions, which is supported by the discussion
in Sec. III-B, we have∥∥Ψ(x′)−Ψ(x)∥∥
2
=
∥∥θ′l − θl∥∥2 + ∥∥ω(θ′h)− ω(θh)]∥∥2
≈ ∥∥ω(θ′h)− ω(θh)∥∥2 . (4)
Then, if we can design a filter ω operating on high-frequency
components so that the difference of purified Saak coefficients
between clean images x and adversarial images x′ is mini-
mized, the difference between clean images and adversarial
images can be minimized as well. In other words, the adver-
sarial perturbations are removed. This will be investigated in
the next subsection.
D. Saak Coefficients Filtering
To reduce adversarial perturbations, we propose three high-
frequency Saak coefficients filtering strategies to minimize
ω(θ′h) − ω(θh) in this subsection. They are dynamic-range
scaling, truncation, and clipping. Each of them will be detailed
below.
As shown in Fig. 2 (b), high-frequency Saak coefficients of
clean images tend to have a smaller dynamic range while those
of adversarial examples have a larger dynamic range. Thus,
the first adversarial perturbation filtering strategy is to re-
scale high-frequency Saak coefficients to match the statistics
of those of clean images. We expect adversarial perturbations
to be mitigated by enforcing the variances of high-frequency
Saak coefficients of clean images and adversarial examples
to be the same. This is an empirical way to to minimize
‖ω(θ′h)− ω(θh)‖2.
The second strategy is to truncate high-frequency Saak
coefficients. Specifically, we set the least important Saak
coefficients to zeros. Since HVS is less sensitive to high-
frequency components, image compression algorithms exploit
this psycho-visual property by quantizing them with a larger
quantization step size. In addition, high-frequency Saak coef-
ficients are very small for clean images, i.e. θh ≈ 0 yet those
of adversarial examples may become larger. Based on this
observation, we can truncate high-frequency Saak coefficients
as a simple way to minimize ‖ω(θ′h)− ω(θh)‖2.
Truncating all high-frequency components might hurt the
classification performance on clean data. The third strategy to
combat adversarial perturbations is to clip the high-frequency
Saak coefficients to a constant small value (instead of zero).
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Setup
We conducted experiments on the CIFAR-10 and the Ima-
geNet datasets. The CIFAR-10 dataset [30] consists of colored
images drawn from 10 categories with a size of 32 × 32.
The train and test sets contain 50,000 and 10,000 images,
respectively. The ImageNet dataset [31] has 1000 classes of
various objects. It contains 1.2 million images in the training
set, and 50,000 in the validation set. We apply the 224× 224
central crop to images from the ImageNet validation set as the
input to craft adversarial examples.
To make a fair comparison with recent work [12], [13],
we follow the same experiment setup of them and use the
DenseNet [32] and the MobileNets [33] as the target models
in generating adversarial examples and evaluating all defense
methods on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet dataset respectively. We
chose six popular and effective attack algorithms: FGSM [16],
BIM [5], DF [19], CW0, CW2 and CWi [21], which generate
adversarial examples at different distortion constraints. The
least-likely class is chosen to generate targeted CW attacks.
Following the setup of [12], [13], we construct a selected set
by taking the first 100 correctly classified samples in the test
set as seed images to craft adversarial examples, since CW0
and CWi attack algorithms are too expensive to run on the
whole test set.
We compare our method with recent adversarial defense
methods on mitigating adversarial effect that applied input
transformations or denoising methods as reported in [11]–
[13], [34]. Our method is very efficient since it requires no
adversarial training, no change on the target model and no
back-propagation to train. It can be easily implemented in
Python and we will release the code.
B. Ablation Studies
As mentioned in [15], the multi-stage Saak transform pro-
vides a family of spatial-spectral representations. The inter-
mediate stages in the Saak transform offer different spatial-
spectral trade-offs. We first study the effect of different hyper-
parameters of the multi-stage Saak transform. We seek to
answer two questions: 1) the spatial dimension of 3D local
cuboids (LCs) in the Saak transform, and (2) the number of
stages used in the Saak transform. We focus on four settings of
forward and inverse Saak transforms: 1) spatial dimension 2×2
in 2 stages, 2) spatial dimension 2× 2 in 4 stages, 3) spatial
dimension 2 × 2 in 5 stages, and 4) spatial dimension 4 × 4
in 2 stages. For simplicity, we denote the settings as ({spatial
dimension}-{stage}). For example, (2-5) represents the setting
of using local cuboid of spatial dimension 2×2 in 5-stage Saak
transform. We choose the high-frequency coefficients scaling
strategy of a factor 0.25 in all experiments and report the
CIFAR-10 classification results in Table I. For each setting,
we consider 3 scenarios in terms of filtered high-frequency
Saak coefficeints.
Since input images of CIFAR-10 is of spatial dimension
32× 32, the spatial dimensions of the output of these settings
are 8×8, 2×2, 1×1, and 2×2, respectively. The corresponding
spectral dimensions are 53, 853, 3413 and 785. As shown in
Table I, we see better defense performance as we increase the
filter size or the stage number. The performance are compa-
rable when the output spatial dimensions are the same. We
believe that this is related to the receptive field size of the last
stage of Saak coefficients used for image reconstruction. The
multi-stage Saak transform can incorporate longer-distance
pixel correlations to mitigate adversarial perturbations more.
For this reason, we choose the 5-stage Saak transform with
Setting (2-2) (2-4) (2-5) (4-2)
Filtered coeff. 40 42 44 640 660 680 2700 2710 2720 580 600 620
clean 84% 84% 68% 96% 96% 91% 96% 95% 95% 96% 95% 91%
FGSM 53% 57% 55% 30% 38% 37% 35% 35% 34% 33% 38% 40%
BIM 65% 69% 62% 49% 61% 61% 63% 63% 65% 54% 58% 64%
DF 77% 77% 65% 83% 83% 82% 86% 86% 86% 84% 83% 81%
CW0 63% 61% 45% 56% 64% 66% 65% 62% 62% 58% 65% 64%
CW2 84% 81% 66% 94% 92% 89% 93% 91% 90% 89% 93% 85%
CWi 82% 80% 67% 90% 90% 85% 92% 92% 92% 87% 89% 85%
All attacks 70.67% 70.83% 60.00% 67.00% 71.33% 70.00% 72.33% 71.50% 71.50% 67.50% 71.00% 69.83%
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON THE SELECTED CIFAR-10 TEST SET WITH FOUR SAAK TRANSFORM SETTINGS UNDER VARIOUS
ATTACKS, WHERE THE FILTERING STRATEGY IS SCALING THE HIGH-FREQUENCY SAAK COEFFICIENTS WITH A FACTOR 0.25. THE OBTAINED BEST
RESULT IS SHOWN IN THE BOLD FONT.
Filtering Truncation Clipping by 0.02
Filtered coeff. 2700 2710 2720 2730 2700 2710 2720 2730
clean 92% 92% 92% 91% 95% 94% 92% 91%
FGSM 60% 63% 63% 62% 44% 47% 47% 44%
BIM 72% 69% 73% 71% 67% 66% 69% 67%
DF 86% 87% 88% 86% 86% 85% 84% 84%
CW0 71% 70% 68% 69% 69% 68% 68% 68%
CW2 91% 90% 90% 90% 91% 91% 91% 91%
CWi 89% 90% 90% 90% 91% 91% 92% 91%
All attacks 78.17% 78.17% 78.67% 78.00% 74.67% 74.67% 75.17% 74.17%
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION RESULTS USING THE HIGH-FREQUENCY SAAK COEFFICIENT TRUNCATION AND CLIPPING STRATEGIES UNDER
VARIOUS ATTACKS FOR THE SELECTED CIFAR-10 TEST SET (WITH SAAK SETTING OF (2-5)). THE OBTAINED BEST RESULT IS SHOWN IN THE BOLD
FONT.
local cuboids of spatial dimension 2× 2 (denoted by (2-5)) in
the following experiments as our evaluation baseline.
We show the classification accuracy using the other two
coefficient filtering strategies; namely, truncation and clipping,
under the same baseline setting (2-5) in Table II. By comparing
Tables I and II, we see that the coefficient truncation strategy
performs the best with a substantial gain over the coefficient
scaling and clipping strategies. Thus, we choose truncation
strategy as the evaluation method on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
datasets.
C. Comparison with State-of-the-Art Methods
We compare our method with other state-of-the-art meth-
ods in combating adversarial perturbations for the CIFAR-10
dataset in Table III. We see that our Saak-transform-based
method outperforms state-of-the-art methods on all attack
types except for the CW0 attack by a significant margin. This
may be attributed to the fact that the CW0 adversarial noise
is more prominent as shown in Fig. 3. It is evident that some
colored patches in Saak-transform-filtered image are caused
by CW0 attack which shows that our filtering strategy fails
to remove the CW0 adversarial noise well since it is already
diffused into low-frequency channels. Yet, it is worthwhile
to point out our proposed method achieves 90% accuracy on
CW2 and CWi adversarial examples of CIFAR-10 dataset,
which is close to the accuracy on clean data. Moreover, our
method is powerful in removing FGSM-based perturbations.
Furthermore, we compare different defense methods on the
ImageNet dataset in Table IV. Our method outperforms other
defense methods when applied alone with the setting of (4-
2). In addition, to verify the above conjecture on the CW0
attack, we cascade the proposed method with two spatial
denoising methods, median and mean smoothing, to further
improve the performance. As shown in Table IV, the median
smoothing method does boost the performance on the CW0
attack significantly. Meanwhile, it improves the classification
accuracy on clean data to 86%. These results demonstrate that
our solution is complementary to spatial smoothing techniques
and, more importantly, can greatly mitigate the adversarial
effect without severely hurting the classification performance
on clean images unlike other methods. This is highly desirable
as a computer vision system is usually unaware whether an
input image is maliciously polluted or not.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a method to filter out adversarial perturbations
based on the Saak transform, a state-of-the-art spectral analysis
algorithm. It can be used as a light-weight add-on to existing
neural networks. The method was comprehensively evaluated
in different settings and filtering strategies. It is effective
and efficient in defending against adversarial attacks as a
result of the following three special characteristics. It is non-
differentiable. It does not modify the target model. It requires
no adversarial training and no label information. It was shown
Defense Methods FGSM BIM DF CW0 CW2 CWi All attacks clean
JPEG [14], [34] (Q=90) 38% 29% 67% 2% 80% 71% 47.83% 94%
Feature Distillation [13] 41% 51% 79% 18% 86% 76% 58.50% 94%
Bit Depth Reduction (5-bit) [12] 17% 13% 40% 0% 47% 19% 22.66% 93%
Bit Depth Reduction (4-bit) [12] 21% 29% 72% 10% 84% 74% 48.33% 93%
Median Smoothing (2x2) [12] 38% 56% 83% 85% 83% 86% 71.83% 89%
Non-local Mean (11-3-4) [12] 27% 46% 76% 11% 88% 84% 55.33% 91%
Cropping [11] 46% 43% 51% 15% 79% 76% 51.66% 86%
TVM [11] 41% 40% 44% 34% 75% 71% 50.83% 92%
Quilting [11] 37% 42% 36% 25% 67% 70% 46.17% 90%
Ours (4-2) 58% 70% 84% 69% 88% 88% 76.17% 90%
Ours (2-5) 63% 73% 88% 68% 90% 90% 78.67% 92%
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION RESULTS OF DIFFERENT DEFENSE METHODS ON THE SELECTED CIFAR-10 TEST SET.
Defense Methods FGSM BIM DF CW0 CW2 CWi All attacks clean
JPEG [14], [34] (Q=90) 1% 0% 8% 4% 68% 32% 18.83% 70%
Feature Distillation [13] 8% 17% 55% 57% 82% 72% 48.50% 66%
Bit Depth Reduction (5-bit) [12] 2% 0% 21% 18% 66% 60% 27.83% 69%
Bit Depth Reduction (4-bit) [12] 5% 4% 44% 67% 82% 79% 46.83% 68%
Median Smoothing (2x2) [12] 22% 28% 72% 85% 84% 81% 62.00% 65%
Median Smoothing (3x3) [12] 33% 41% 66% 79% 79% 76% 62.33% 62%
Non-local Mean (11-3-4) [12] 10% 25% 57% 47% 86% 82% 51.17% 65%
Ours (4-2) 47% 58% 65% 66% 71% 69% 62.67% 69%
Ours (4-2) + Mean (2× 2) 31% 46% 64% 68% 81% 81% 61.83% 81%
Ours (4-2) + Median (2× 2) 33% 45% 70% 84% 83% 83% 66.33% 86%
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION RESULTS OF DIFFERENT DEFENSE METHODS ON THE SELECTED IMAGENET TEST SET.
by experiments that the proposed method outperforms state-
of-the-art defense methods by a large margin on both the
CIFAR-10 and the ImageNet datasets while maintaining good
performance on clean images.
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